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Summary 
 
Apart from poverty alleviation which is the prominent mission of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), MFIs also need to maintain their financial sustainability to assure that they will have 
working capital in the next period. “Repayment rate” is a common indicator used to measure 
financial sustainability of MFIs. The aim of this study is to investigate the significant factors 
affecting the level of repayment rates, using the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
(CPSG), a best practice MFI with a high repayment rate in Thailand (www, Prachathai, 2011), 
as the case study. Data used in this study is from three sources: the CPSG’s documents, an 
interview, and observation. 
  
The results of this study find that a 100 percent repayment rate of the CPSG arises out of two 
underlying factors: jointly liable group-lending contract and strong incentives. Employing 
jointly liable group-lending contracts will help the CPSG mitigate voluntary default or the 
strategic default problem and then lead to high repayment rate achievement. For strong 
incentives, the CPSG’s regulations have been designed to generate strong incentives inducing 
the borrowing member to repay the loan voluntarily, for example, a delinquent borrower will 
be deprived of the borrowing right for one year, and  a default borrower who are dismissed 
from the membership will be excluded from the CPSG’ welfare services.  
 
However, it is worth noting that in employing the group-lending scheme the CPSG shifts the 
burden of default risk to the members who are in a worse position to bear default risk than the 
lender (Stiglitz, 1990). Moreover, in this study the group-lending scheme employed by the 
CPSG has mitigated only the strategic default problem by neglecting adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. By doing so, the CPSG may have to face involuntary default (adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems) in the future, and the borrowing member whose 
investment fails may be deteriorated by this lending scheme as well.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the introductory part of the thesis, including problem background, problem, 
aim and delimitation, and outline. 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
Based on the commercial discipline that focuses solely on profit maximizing, it is reasonable 
for conventional banks and/or formal financial institutions in excluding poor people from 
their target customers. There are at least three main reasons to do so. Firstly, poor people lack 
credit history which banks will use as primary data for the lending process (Van Tassel, 
1999). Secondly, the poor cannot pledge any collateral, especially land, to compensate in case 
of default. Lastly, monitoring the loans provided to poor people is costly since most of them 
tend to be small amounts of money and the bank has little information about the poor. To 
offset these disadvantages of poor people and make the bank viable simultaneously, the banks 
will charge high interest rates from the poor. Therefore, if the poor would like to borrow 
money, they have to burden with high borrowing cost. This may make the poor worsen. On 
the other hand, based on human right discipline which believes in equality of all humans 
(www, United Nations Human Rights, 2011), access to credit is one of human rights 
regardless of social and financial positions (Yunus, 1999)1. Namely, the poor have authority 
in obtaining loans as long as they think they have potential to repay, and banks should support 
them. It seems that compatibility between commercial discipline and human right discipline is 
impossible.  
 
In 1976, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank, proved that commercial 
discipline and human right discipline can be compatible, i.e., Grameen Bank of which target 
clients are poor women can alleviate the poverty and gain the profit simultaneously. In 
addition, there are other successful microfinance institutions (MFIs) that operate their 
business like Grameen Bank: for example, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), the Associations for 
Social Advancement (ASA) in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC), the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) in Tanzania, and ACCION International in 
Latin America (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Hamada, 2010).   
 
To measure the success of these MFIs compared to other MFIs and formal financial 
institutions, one of the indicators that can refer to alleviating the poverty and gaining the 
profit simultaneously is “repayment rate”. Namely, achieving a high repayment rate of MFIs 
implies that the poor borrowers can earn enough income to repay their loans, and MFIs will 
gain the profit and surely have working capital for lending in the next period.  For instance, 
according to Khandker (1996), Grameen Bank which had repayment rates above 95 percent 
has the significant impacts on the overall income growth and poverty alleviation and gain the 
profit margin about 9 percent of its assets (while other financial institutions obtain the profit 
margin of 3-4 percent).  
 
In Thailand, the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group (CPSG) is a best practice MFI of 
high repayment rate achievement (www, Prachathai, 2011). As a result of a 100 percent 
repayment rate or no defaulted loans, the CPSG’s working capital has been obviously 
                                                          
1 This notion is consistent with Amartya Sen’s book, Development as Freedom. In this book, he strives for 
changing the interpretation of development to include five significant freedoms as political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (Sen, 1999)    
  2 
 
 
prospering from 6810 Baht in 1996 (Boonla, 2003) to 700 million Baht in 2010 (www, 
Prachathai, 2011). The working capital of 700 million Baht has been used for two main 
purposes: lending to the group member and being the capital for welfare provision.  
 
1.2 Problem and aim 
 
Previous research regarding microfinance institutions in Thailand have mainly focused on 
measuring the impact and the level of reaching the poor by targeting at “village funds” and 
NGOs-led MFIs (e.g. Coleman 1999, Coleman 2006 and Kaboski & Townsend 2006). 
Despite the importance of the repayment rate as mentioned above, there is a lack of research 
on it.  
 
Furthermore, it is interesting that Grameen Bank, which is one of the best microfinance 
models in the world, have the repayment rate of 98 percent (Hamada, 2010), but which of the 
CPSG is 100 percent (www, Prachathai, 2011). This implies that the CPSG may have 
additional factors which Grameen Bank can adopt to increase its repayment rate to 100 
percent. 
 
In order to fill the gap, the aim of this research is to investigate what is the significant factors 
affecting the level of repayment rates by choosing the CPSG as the case study. The research 
question of this study is  
 
• What are the key factors underlying the CPSG’s high repayment rate? 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 
Due to time limitation, the fundamental framework applied in this study is “the case study 
approach”. The disadvantage of this approach is that frequently the findings and conclusions 
from a case study have come from unsystematic procedures, for example, ambigious evidence 
and biased views (Yin, 2009). The unsystematic procedures involve the aspect of research 
quality, especially reliability and validity (Golafshani, 2003). Furthermore, It is important to 
note that the results from a case study may become true only under the specific condition and 
environment surrounding the case. In other words, the results from the case study cannot 
generalize in every case: they are practical under some specific conditions.  
 
In collecting data, interview and observation used in this study may come with an information 
bias, for example, the interviewees’ bias and the researcher’s interpretation. 
 
1.4 Outline   
 
This study is organized as follows: 
 
• Chapter 1 (Introduction) presents an overview of the general background of 
microfinance, problem and aim, delimitation and outline. 
 
• Chapter 2 (A theoretical perspective) describes the theoretical framwork in relation to 
this research.  
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• Chapter 3 (Method) presents the method used in this work, including research design, 
research strategy, and data collection. 
 
• Chapter 4 (Background for the empirical study) outlines the background information 
of microfinance in Thailand and of the CPSG. 
 
• Chapter 5 (The empirical results) presents the data collected from the fieldwork. 
 
• Chapter 6 (Analysis and discussion) presents the empirical analysis and discussion by 
utilizing the content of the preceding chapters.  
 
• Chapter 7 (Conclusions) summarizes the result and gives the suggestion for future 
research. 
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2 A theoretical perspective  
 
This chapter presents the theoretical perspective that will help to understand this research 
clearly: the concept of microfinance, the key features of microfinance, and delinquency 
measurement. 
 
2.1 Concept of microfinance 
 
2.1.1 Definition of microfinance 
 
“What is the exact definition of microfinance?” is the underlying question of understanding 
microfinance. According to Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)’s homepage, 
microfinance’s definition is: 
 
“Microfinance offers poor people access to basic financial services such as loans, savings, 
money transfer services and microinsurance” (www, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
1, 2011). 
 
In his essay, Robinson (1998) defines microfinance as follows: 
 
“Microfinance refers to small-scale financial services for both credits and deposits – that are 
provided to people who farm or fish or herd; operate small or microenterprises where goods 
are produced, recycled, repaired, or traded; provide services; work for wages or 
commissions; gain income from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or 
machinery and tools; and to other individuals and local groups in developing countries, in 
both rural and urban areas” 
 
Additionally, Schreiner (2001) also describes the definition of microfinance as 
 
“Formal schemes designed to improve the wellbeing of the poor through better access to 
savings services and loans” 
 
As mentioned above, it is shown that there is no rigid definition of microfinance; 
nevertheless, we can summarize its general idea as “the openness of banking opportunities to 
poor people in reaching financial services, such as microcredit, microsavings, microinsurance, 
risk management and etc”. 
 
2.1.2 The objectives of microfinance 
 
According to Hamada (2010), there have been three essential microfinance objectives: 
outreach, impact, and financial sustainability. 
  
- Outreach to the poor. A microfinance institution should expand its financial  
services to cover all demands of the poor, especially the poorest of the poor. 
 
- Making a positive impact. After obtaining financial services, clients’ situations,  
both financially and socially, should be better off. 
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- Maintaining financial sustainability. Source of capital used in microfinance  
institutions and cost-efficient operations are two important factors affecting the financial 
sustainability of microfinance institutions. 
 
2.2 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory has been used to examine an agency relationship (Greenwood, 2003). Jensen 
and Meckling define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Often, an agency relationship will pose the agency problem which results from the goal 
conflict between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Huarng, 1995; Saam, 2007). 
In other words, the principal’s utility negatively correlates with the agent’s utility, or we can 
draw an equation as follows (Saam, 2007):  
 
UP (R) = 1/UA (I) 
 
Imposing that   UP = Utility of the principal 
                          UA= Utility of the agent 
                           R = Returns     
                           I   = Income 
 
From the equation, we will see that the principal’s utility will depend on returns, whereas the 
agent’s utility will depend on income. Both the principal and the agent want to maximize 
returns and income respectively. As a consequence, there is a trade-off between the utility of 
the principal and the utility of the agent (ibid.).   
    
Consequently, the focus of the agency theory is to design the optimal contract for resolving 
the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1985 & 1989; Bergen et al., 1992), or aligning the goals 
between principals and agents (Johnson & Droege, 2004). There are two types of contracts 
used to solve the agency problem: behaviour-based contracts and outcome-based contracts 
(Eisenhardt, 1985 & 1989; Bergen et al., 1992; Greenwood, 2003; Johnson & Droege, 2004). 
Under a behaviour-based contract, the principal will directly monitor, assess, and reward the 
agent on the basis of information about the agent’s actual behaviour (Bergen et al., 1992). The 
principal will observe the agent’s behaviour by investing in information systems, for example, 
budgeting systems, cost accounting measures, and additional layers of management 
(Eisenhardt, 1985 & 1989). Indeed, the principal cannot completely supervise the agent’s 
behaviour because of informational asymmetry between the principal and agent (Bergen et 
al., 1992). The implication of informational asymmetry between the principal and the agent is 
that the principal is unable to observe the characteristics (hidden characteristics), intentions 
(hidden intentions), information (hidden information), and actions (hidden actions) of the 
agent (Saam, 2007). 
For the outcome-based contract or the incentive-based contract (Greenwood, 2003; Johnson & 
Droege, 2004), the agent will be rewarded on the basis of realized outcome (Bergen et al., 
1992). Logically, the agent will put the full effort to gain a high level of outcome since the 
remuneration paid to the agent will depend on the actual outcome. It is worth noting that 
under this contract the principal will not monitor and assess the agent (this is different from 
the behaviour-based contract), but he/she will pay attention only to performance outcome 
(e.g., sales). The principal needs to design the outcome-measuring systems. On the one hand 
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this contract can induce the agent to pursue the goals that are directly associated with the 
principal’s goals (Johnson & Droege, 2004; Bergen et al., 1992), but on the other hand, this 
contract shifts risk from the principal to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1985 & 1989; Bergen et al., 
1992). The issue of risk arises because the outcome is partly a function of uncontrollable 
variables, for instance, government policies, economic climate, competitor actions, 
technological change, and so on – called as the outcome uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1989). These 
variables are out of the agent’s capability. If the outcome uncertainty is low, the costs of 
shifting risk borne by the principal will be low (ibid.). In essence, the outcome-based contract 
will not only motivate the agent’s behaviour, but also change risk sharing patterns between 
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1985). However, we should realize that in the agency 
theory the principal who is assumed to be risk neutral is in a better position to bear risk than 
the agent who is assumed to be risk averse (Eisenhardt 1985 & 1989; Bergen et al., 1992; 
Saam, 2007). This is because the principal can diversify his/her investment, but the agent 
cannot (Eisenhardt 1985 & 1989; Bergen et al., 1992). 
 
Interestingly, both the behaviour-based contract and the outcome-based contract have been 
mainly designed to maximize the principal’s utility, rather than maximizing the joint utility of 
both the principal and the agent (Bergen et al., 1992). Employing either the behaviour-based 
contract or the outcome-based contract will depend on comparing the cost of measuring 
behaviour and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1985 & 1989). 
 
2.3 Microfinance stakeholders and evolution 
 
2.3.1 Microfinance stakeholders 
 
There are three essential stakeholders engaging in microfinance as shown in figure 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Microfinance stakeholders 
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Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). MFIs are a financial organization that provides financial 
services to underprivileged clients, which mostly are the poor (www, Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2, 2011). We can divide the types of MFIs into two broad groups: formal and 
informal. Formal MFIs are those MFIs which operate under two regulations stipulated by the 
government and by the group members, for example, commercial banks which target at the 
poor, the government’s specific-purposed banks, credit unions and credit cooperatives. For 
informal MFIs, their operation is under only group member-stipulated regulations, for 
instance, self-help groups and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) (ibid.). 
 
MFIs’ clients. A number of people have usually adhered to a thought that MFIs’ clients are 
only those who incur poverty and are excluded from conventional banking. Indeed, MFIs’ 
clients have also included vulnerable non-poor people who become more vulnerable to 
external shocks and easily fall into poverty (www, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 3, 
2011; Fernando, 2007). In other words, those who fall in or have a possibility to incur poverty 
are all MFIs’ clients. Particularly, in Islamic countries in which social class has been 
characterized by gender, the majority of MFIs’ clients have been women who have had lower 
social class than men. 
 
Institutional environment.  Governments and regulations are two vital environments 
surrounding microfinance, particularly after transforming to microfinance industry of MFIs 
(Arun, 2005). Namely, governments on behalf of the policy maker and the regulator will 
frame microfinance direction and enact regulations by which MFIs have to comply with. For 
this reason, we can say that MFIs’ development depends in part on appropriate regulatory 
frameworks enacted by the visionary government. 
 
2.3.2 The evolution of microfinance  
 
From the past to the present, the microfinance evolution can be divided into three periods of 
time: the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s, and the end of 1990s (Glaubitt et al, 2006) 
 
The 1980s 
During the 1950s to 1980s, the microfinance service was restricted to the microcredit program 
subsidized by governments and/or donors with a focus on the agricultural sector (Glaubitt et 
al, 2006; Hamada, 2010). The success of the microcredit program in this period was outreach 
to the target clients, poor households and microenterprises, by not requiring collateral. 
However, this program accompanied with shortcomings as follows (Glaubitt et al, 2006): 
 
- The microfinance service was limited to microcredit. 
- The number of target clients was small, covering only clients in the agricultural 
sector. 
- Lacking a systematic approach posed the high transaction cost problem. 
 
Beginning of the 1990s 
From the shortcomings in the last period, gradual integration into mainstream financial sector, 
which builds cost-efficient operations and expands the customer base, was applied by many 
microfinance programs. In other words, microfinance programs were transforming themselves 
into microfinance models by imposing financial sustainability as one of their objectives and 
extending their clients as generally poor people, not just the poor in the agricultural sector 
(Glaubitt et al, 2006; Hamada, 2010). The prominent example is Grameen Bank. We should, 
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however, bear in mind that governments and donors were still two important sources of 
capitals for microfinance models in this period.  
 
The end of the 1990s 
Microfinance models in the last period have been transforming into microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) since operating in the form of microfinance models subsidized by governments/donors 
was incompatible with the mainstream financial sector. This occurrence has resulted in a large 
scale of clients and qualified financial products; moreover, there has been the creation of 
networks that link MFIs together like commercial banks (Glaubitt et al, 2006). We can say 
that in this period (and presently) the border between MFIs and commercial banks are blurred.  
 
In conclusion, microfinance’s evolution is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The evolution of microfinance 
 
 
2.4 Key features of microfinance 
 
2.4.1 Collateral-free contracts 
 
According to Balkenhol &Schutte (2001), collateral is an asset pledged by a borrower to a 
lender for covering the risk of a loan. If the borrower can repay the loan in full, he/she will get 
the collateral back. On the contrary, if he/she defaults on payment, the lender has right to 
seize and sell the collateral to offset the loan. Furthermore, in their study, Ghatak & Guinnane 
(1999) indicate that pledging collateral is the method used by conventional banks for 
separating safe borrowers from risky ones. If the bank offers two different contracts: high 
interest rates with low pledged collateral and low interest rates with high pledged collateral, 
risky borrowers ,who are likely to fail more often (and lose their collateral) and gain high 
returns simultaneously, will select the former and safe borrowers the latter (ibid.).  
 
Despite the importance of collateral, a MFI cannot oblige their poor customers to pledge 
physical collateral since they have little or no collateral. Therefore, loans provided by MFIs 
Stage III 
Source: Glaubitt et al. in Matthaus & Pischke (2006: 215)   
Stage II 
Stage I 
The 1980s: 
‐ Isolated donor-dependent 
microcredit programs 
Beginning of 1990s: 
‐ Sustainability, financial 
broadening and deepening, 
‐ Creation of a regulatory 
framework, 
‐ professionalism 
Beginning of 1990s: 
‐ systemic model (integration 
into the financial sector) 
‐ wide range of qualified 
products, 
‐ network building and 
beginning of an integrated 
institutional structure 
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will be in the form of physical-collateral-free loans2. Although lack of physical collateral 
excludes the poor from conventional financial institutions, group-lending with joint liability 
which plays role as social collateral will help the poor to reach financial services (Armendariz 
de Aghion & Morduch, 2005).  
 
2.4.2 Group lending with joint liability 
 
With regard to the microfinance aspect, informational asymmetry between the lender and the 
borrower is the underlying reason for the agency problem (Armendariz de Aghion & 
Morduch, 2005). Then, the agency problem is the main obstacle to achieving a high 
repayment rate as shown in figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The obstacle to attaining a high repayment rate 
 
Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch classify the agency problem caused by information 
asymmetry into three distinct stages with three major problems (ibid.). First, before granting 
loans, a lender has little or no reliable information to distinguish risky borrowers from safe 
ones, or frequently the risky borrowers may pretend that they are the safe borrowers and the 
lender do not know about it. This problem is called as adverse selection or the screening 
problem. Second, after granting loans, a lender cannot completely ensure that the borrower 
will utilize the loan appropriately, and then be able to repay the loan. Sometimes the borrower 
may use the loan for non income- generating activities. This problem is called as moral 
hazard or the monitoring problem. Lastly, after investment returns have been realized, a 
lender is unable to force the borrower to repay the loan if he/she is reluctant to do. This 
problem is named as strategic default or the enforcement problem (Wenner, 1995; Van 
Tassel, 1999; Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Kono & Takahashi, 2010). 
Theoretically, if MFIs can solve these problems, they will achive a high repayment rate as 
shown in figure 4 (Wenner, 1995; Besley & Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999; Ghatak & Guinnane, 
1999; Kono & Takahashi, 2010).   
 
                                                          
2 Currently, savings discipline of borrowers can be used as collateral, for example SafeSave in the Dhaka Slums 
and Grameen Bank (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, 136). 
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Figure 4: How to achieve a high repayment rate 
 
 
Normally, the lending scheme used by the conventional bank is the individual lending 
contract. With the individual lending scheme, an individual borrower is required to pledge 
collateral as a condition of borrowing process, and the bank will take a responsibility for 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement. In comparison with the agency theory, the individual 
lending contract is similar to the behaviour-based contract that the the principal (the lender) 
will directly supervise the agent (the borrower). But this lending scheme is incompatible with 
the microfinance’s context for two reasons. First, most clients of MFIs are the poor who lack 
collateral to pledge. Second, there is informational asymmetry between the lender and the 
borrower; therefore, the individual lending contract cannot effectively solve three problems 
mentioned above.  
 
Alternatively, the lending contract used by most MFIs is the group-lending contract with joint 
liability. This contract asks the borrowers to form the borrowing group by themselves- known 
as self-selected group, by not pledging collateral. Despite non-collateral requirements, joint 
liability between the group members is likely to be social collateral pledged to the lender i.e., 
all group members have to take a responsibility for all loans of the group members in case of 
default (Ghatak, 1999; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). The lender will transfer three main 
responsibilities: screening, monitoring, and enforcement, to all group members, or the lender 
will focus solely on the repayment. The basic notion underlying this lending scheme is that 
the borrowers with connections of shared area or other bonds based on kinship and occupation 
have each other’s information, especially about investment returns, better than the lender 
(Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Van Tassel, 1999). There is no informational asymmetry between 
the borrowers. Thereby, dealing with three problems mentioned above by the borrowers (the 
group-lending contract) is more effective than by the lenders (the individual contract). 
Moreover, non-collateral requirements are beneficial to the poor who has liitle or no collateral 
to pledge.  
 
In comparison with the agency theory, the group-lending contract is similar to the outcome-
based contract or the incentive-based contract. The lender or the principal will pay attention 
only to the repayment (outcome) by shifting risk, particularly default risk, to the group 
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borrowers or the agent (Stiglitz, 1990; Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Interesting, 
in the microfinance’s context joint liability will play role as as incentive for borrowers to 
solve three agency problems since the members prefer to repaying their own loans to repaying 
others’ loans.      
 
In conclusion, employing group-lending with joint liability can mitigate three problems: 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and strategic default, and then lead to a high repayment rate.  
 
Mitigating adverse selection 
In case of no informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, a lender is able to 
distinguish safe borrowers from risky ones, and then charge them at different interest rates 
depending on the borrowing cost. Unfortunately, this is an extreme case because in the real 
world lenders do not have perfect information about their borrowers. The lender cannot 
distinguish safe borrowers from risky ones; hence, the lender have to offer loans to all 
borrowers at the same average rate (Ghatak, 1999), which mostly will be at the high level to 
compensate for the possibility of having risky borrowers (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005). In other words, safe borrowers implicitly subsidize risky borrowers (ibid.). This leads 
to the lemons model of Akerlof (1970) i.e., at the average interest rate the safe borrowers 
prefer leaving the market to shouldering the subsidy on the risky borrowers; eventually at the 
equilibrium of not using group lending with joint liability there will be only the risky 
borrowers with high interest rates in the market.   
 
Group lending is the key to the solution of this problem. Since the borrowers know each other 
better than the lender and all borrowers prefer to have safe borrowers in their group because 
of shouldering lower expected jointly liable payment (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999), the safe 
borrower is prone to find other safe partners to form a borrowing group and the risky 
borrower is implicitly compelled to form a group with other risky partners. For the bank, it 
can use the level of joint liability and interest rates to distinguish safe groups from risky 
groups. Namely, if a bank offers two distinct lending contracts: high interest rates with low 
joint liability and low interest rate with high joint liability, a risky borrower will select the 
former since he/she does not want to bear the risk of other risky borrowers who are likely to 
fail, a safe borrower will select the opposite (ibid.). By doing so, at the equilibrium of 
adopting group lending with joint liability there will be both groups: safe borrowers and risky 
borrowers, with lower interest rates than the equilibrium of not using group lending with joint 
liability.    
 
For this reason, the bank, the safe borrower, and the risky borrower will benefit from group 
lending with joint liability simultaneously. The bank will be able to separate safe borrowers 
from risky ones, and then charge them with different interest rates depending on the 
borrowing cost of each group. The safe borrowers who are excluded from the equilibrium of 
not using group lending with joint liability will be attracted back into the market because they 
do not bear the default risk of risky borrowers. For the risky borrowers, coming back of the 
safe borrowers will reduce the interest rates at the equilibrium, so that they will have the 
lower interest burden. We can say that group lending with joint liability can improve social 
welfare of all players in financial markets (Ghatak, 1999; Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005). 
 
Mitigating moral hazard 
After the loan has been granted, a lender will economically expect a borrower to produce at 
the profit-maximizing point (marginal benefit = marginal cost). At this point the lender will 
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ascertain that the borrower has the ability to repay the loan (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). 
Indeed, the lender is unable to ensure that borrowers will put the full efforts or take the full 
actions required to achieve their projects: there is informational asymmetry between the 
lender and the borrower.  
 
According to Stiglitz (1990), based on perfect information between borrowers, jointly liable 
group-lending contracts can mitigate the moral hazard problem by inducing group members to 
monitor each other’s investment projects – known as “peer monitoring”. In some cases, if a 
group member chooses to invest in the excessively risky project, the other group members 
will inflict a penalty upon him/her (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Stiglitz argues 
that jointly liable responsibilities are the underlying incentive of peer monitoring. Namely, 
undertaking a risky project, which is most likely to fail, of a group member means that the 
others in that group have to shoulder high risk inevitably. To prevent this situation group 
members have to monitor (and sometimes have to punish) their peers to only invest in 
projects with acceptable risk3.    
 
Mitigating strategic default 
After investment returns have been realized, the following problem faced by the lender is 
“strategic default” or “enforcement problem”. This problem arises from the lender’s inability 
to enforce the borrower to repay the loan (Besley & Coate, 1995). In other words, the lender’s 
sanctions are restricted from legal frameworks (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). Additionally, if 
the borrower claims that his/her investment is unprofitable, the lender cannot verify the 
borrower’s actual return.   
 
According to Besley & Coate (1995), employing jointly liable group-lending contracts has 
two opposing effects on the lender: positive and negative. Positively, in case of a 
delinquent/default borrower, the lender will ascertain that his/her partners will repay his/her 
loan instead. Negatively, if the entire group defaults or the partners refuse to repay peers’ 
loans, the lender is most likely to get loss. However, they also indicate that if the borrowing 
group is constituted from the community with a high degree of social ties, social punishments 
imposed by group members can mitigate the negative problem. Defaulting intendedly, a 
delinquent borrower and/or his/her peers in the borrowing group have to incur social 
penalties. For example, the wrath of group members or the expulsion from the community. 
Indeed, such peer pressure derives from the fact that in general a borrower does not want to 
repay others’ loans, he/she wants to pay only his/her loan. Therefore, with sufficient social 
ties and social penalties, jointly liable group-lending contracts can yield high repayment rates. 
 
In conclusion, we can categorize loan default caused by the agency problem into two types: 
voluntary and involuntary (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). Involuntary default arises from 
undesirable situations, for example, being highly indebted, less profitable, and less liquid 
(Fidrmuc & Hainz, 2010), which in turn influence the borrower’s ability to repay the loan 
(Brehanu & Fufa, 2008), or assuming that the borrower will repay the loan if he/she is able to 
do (Besley & Coate, 1995). With the informational advantages of group lending with joint 
liability, group members will screen and monitor each other’ projects in order to prevent 
involuntary default (mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard). On the contrary, the 
voluntary default refers to a circumstance that a borrower is able to repay the loan but he/she 
is unwilling to do. Additionally, if the debtor claims that his/her project got failed, the creditor 
cannot verify it. Apart from informational advantages, joint liability group lending also 
                                                          
3 An acceptable risk of the project in a group with safe borrowers will be lower than in a group with risky 
borrowers. 
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creates “peer pressure” which can enforce the group members to repay the loan (mitigating 
strategic default). 
 
2.5 Delinquency measurement 
 
In lending to the poor, MFIs need to pay attention to the quality of loan portfolio which is 
associated with the default risk (www, CGAP, 4, 2011; Mondragón-Vélez & Glen, 2011). The 
lower the quality of loan portfolio MFIs start with, the higher their default risk occurs 
(Mondragón-Vélez & Glen, 2011). Measuring loan portfolio quality through performance 
ratios will help MFIs cope with the default problem. However, it is important to note that the 
denominator of performace ratios used to measure loan portfolio quality is only “gross loans” 
(www, CGAP, 4, 2011) because the meaning of gross loans refers to the loan portfolio.  
 
Default is rooted in the delinquency which occurs when one loan repayment is one day late 
(ibid.). The longer the delinquency is overdue, the higher the default risk occurs. 
Consequently, we can measure the default risk through delinquency ratios. According to 
Rosenburg (1999), there are three delinquency ratios: collection rates, arrears rate, and 
portfolio at risk rates (PAR).  
 
Collection rates 
The formula of this ratio is 
 
 
 
 
This ratio measures money collected in one period against total money due in the same 
period. The numerator of this ratios is actual cash received in one period, and the denominator 
is the total amount due to be paid in the same period. Sometimes, this ratio may be called 
“recovery rate”, “repayment rate”, or “loan recuperation” (ibid.). The advantage of this ratio is 
that the information is simple and easy to collect (ibid.). However, we should realize that the 
collection rate cannot measure loan portfolio quality becasuse its denominator is not gross 
loans, not referring to the loan portfolio.  
 
A collection rate is used to describe a 100 percent repayment rate of the CPSG (discussed 
more in chapter 5). 
 
Arrears rates 
The formula of this ratio is 
 
 
 
 
This ratio measures the amount of loans past due as a percentage of gross loans – or know as 
outstanding portfolio (ibid.). The numerator is total loan amounts past due, while the 
denominator is the total loans. It is worth noting that this ratio may pose the illusion problem 
to MFIs since the amount past due is usually small relative to gross loans. Therefore, an 
arrears rate will be a small number. With a small arrear rate, MFIs may be tempted to feel 
complacent about their performance while loan portfolio quality is deteriorating gradually 
(ibid.). 
 
Amount collected this period 
Amount due this period 
 Late payments 
Gross loans
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Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 
The formula of this rate is 
 
 
 
 
 
This ratio is commonly used not only by MFIs but also by the conventional bank for 
measuring loan portfolio quality.This denominator of PAR rate is the same as an arrears rate, 
but its numerator will be the outstanding loan with late payment which refers to the default 
risk (ibid.). In general, a PAR will be relevant to any degree of lateness (ibid.). 
 
In microfinance, PAR30 will be use as a common breakpoint (www, CGAP, 5, 2011; www, 
United Nations Capital Development Fund, 2011). PAR30 focuses on the outstanding balance 
of all loans with a payment more than 30 day late. For the CPSG, a loan with one day late will 
be categorized as the delinquent loan; hence, the PAR of the CPSG is PAR0.   
 
Table 1 shows the underlying concept of three delinquency ratios described above. 
 
Table 1: The underlying concept of collection rates, arrears rates, and PAR rates 
 
Delinquency ratio Formula Measurement 
Collection rate 
 
Amount collected this period 
Amount due this period 
 
Shows amount paid against 
amount due or expected during 
a specific period. This ratio dose 
not provide information 
regarding loan portfolio quality. 
Arrears rate 
Late payment 
Gross loans 
 
Measures amount of loan 
principal principal that is 
overdue. Despite being ableto 
measure loan portfolio quality, 
this ratio is likely to create the 
overoptimistic complacency of 
portfolio quality. 
PAR rate Outstanding balance of loans past due Gross loans 
This ratio is generally used to 
measure the quality of loan 
portfolio. Portfolio aging will 
separate more risky loans from 
less risky ones. The longer an 
outstanding loan is overdue, the 
higher the risk it will be the 
defaulted loan.  
 
Source: Adapted from CGAP (www, CGAP, 4, 2011) 
 
 
 
Outstanding balance of loans past due 
Gross loans
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To exemplify three delinquency indicators mentioned above, we suppose that there are three 
borrowers: A, B, and C. Each borrowed $500 from the bank with $100 monthly amortization, 
by assuming that there is no interest payment. Particularly PAR rate, we will focus on PAR0 
and PAR30. 
 
 Principal  Monthly amortization 
A 500  100 
B 500  100 
C 500  100 
Gross loans 1500 Amount due each month 300 
 
Case I: In the 1st amortization, there is no delinquency. 
 
Collection rate  = Amount collected this period / Amount due this period 
 = 300 / 300 
 = 1 or 100% 
 
Arrears rate = Late payment / Gross loans 
 = 0 / 1500 
 = 0  
 
 PAR0 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 0 / 1500 
 
 
= 0 
PAR30 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 0 / 1500 
 = 0 
 
Case II: In the 1st amortization, Mr. A’s payment is overdue. 
 
Collection rate  = Amount collected this period / Amount due this period 
 = 200 (Principal amortization of Mr. B and C) / 300 
 = 0.67 or 67% 
 
Arrears rate = Late payment / Gross loans 
 = 100 (Mr. A’s late payment) / 1500 
 = 0.067 or 6.7%  
 
PAR0 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 500 (Mr. A’s outstanding loan) / 1500 
 = 0.33 or 33% 
 
PAR30 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 0 / 1500 
 = 0 
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Case III: In the 2nd amortization, Mr. A’s payment is still overdue, and Mr. B’payment    
                is also overdue. 
 
Collection rate  = Amount collected this period / Amount due this period 
 = 100 (Principal amortization of Mr. C) / 300 
 = 0.33 or 33% 
 
Arrears rate = Late payment / Gross loans 
 = 200 (Late payment of Mr. A and Mr. B) / 1500 
 = 0.13 or 13%  
 
PAR0 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 900 (Outstanding loans of MR.A and MR. B4) / 1500 
 = 0.67 or 67% 
 
PAR30 = Outstanding balance of loans past due / Gross loans 
 = 500 (Mr. A’s outstanding loan) / 1500 
 = 0.33 or 33% 
 
On the one hand increasing degree of lateness from zero to thirty days (from PAR0 to PAR30) 
will decrease the level of deault risk from 67 percent to 33 percent, but on the other hand, the 
default risk with the higher degree of lateness is less likely to recover the unpaid balance than 
that with the lower degree of lateness (Rosenburg, 1999). Additionally, imposing degree of 
lateness should be consistent with the revenue cycle of the borrower. For example, if a 
borrower is the farmer, he will acquire the revenue after harvesting his crops. Frequent 
amortization may be inconsistent with his revenue cycle (ibid.). Imposing degree of lateness 
at the low level may distort the actual payment capability of the borrower. For this reson, 
MFIs need to group their degree of lateness corresponding to the revenue cycle of the poor 
borrowers. This require MFIs to make the systematic account for the purpose of grouping the 
appropriate degree of lateness (ibid.).  
 
Despite the importance of PAR rates described above, the most appropriate ratio for this study 
is the collection rate. Since most of the CPSG’s committees are the villagers whose 
accounting knowledge is in a low level, the group’s account will be the simple account 
generating simple information. This is consistent with the advantage of the collection rate 
which uses elementary information for calculating the result (ibid.).   
 
 
 
.          
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In the second amortization, the outstanding loan of MR. B accounts for 400 because he paid 100 in the first 
amortization already. 
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3 Method 
 
This chapter presents the method applied in this thesis, including research design, research 
strategy, and data collection.  
 
3.1 Research design 
 
According to Creswell (2009), there are three types of research designs: qualitative, 
quantitative, and mixed method. There is no one best method for doing research; hence, the 
researcher needs to choose the most appropriate method for his/her research. In this thesis, the 
most appropriate method is “qualitative research method” which is a way for exploring and 
understanding the meaning of the situation derived from a social or human problem (ibid.). 
This definition is consistent with the aim of this thesis which intends to understand the reason 
underlying a 100 percnet repayment rate of the CPSG.  
 
In conducting qualitative research, there are two concerns in relation to research quality: 
reliability and validity (Golafshani, 2003). 
 
• Reliability: Data used in qualitative research should be examined, referring to 
trustworthiness.  
 
• Validity: The research instrument should accurately measure what is intended to 
measure. 
 
With regard to reliability, data used in this study is the primary data collected through the 
interview, observation, and the CPSG’s documents. Since this study tries to understand the 
phenomenon of achieving a high repayment rate of the CPSG, using primary data will enables 
the researcher to get closer to what actually happened than secondary data, leadin to 
trustworthniness. In case of validity, the research instruments, interview, observation, and the 
CPSG’s documents, will be specifically used for the purpose of extracting the key factors 
underlying high repayment rate achievement which is the research question of this study.    
 
3.2 Research strategy 
 
Though there are many ways to conduct qualitative research, for example, experiment, 
survey, archival analysis, history, case studies and etc., considering which methods are the 
best one for the research depends upon three conditions: types of research question, whether 
there is the control over actual behavioral events?, and whether there is focus on 
contemporary events?, as illustrated in table 2 (Yin, 2009). 
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Table 2: Relevant situations for different research methods 
 
Method Form of research question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioral Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events? 
Experiment How, Why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where,  
How many, How much? No 
Yes 
Archival Analysis Who, What, Where,  
How many, How much? No 
Yes/No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case study How, Why? No yes 
 
Source: COSMOS Corporation cited in Yin (2009: 8) 
 
Based on three conditions referred above, “the case study” is the most proper research method 
for this thesis since the conditions of this method is consistent with the aim of this study. This 
thesis aims at understanding the contemporary phenomenon of a 100 percent repayment rate 
of the CPSG, by not imposing any control on behavioral events. In line with Yin (2009), he 
states that the case study is the method that helps the researcher to understand a real-life 
phenomenon in depth by encompassing important contextual conditions.   
 
It is worth noting that a qualitative case study does not aim to produce generalizable results 
but rather to make a better understanding of a specific circumstance (Marshall, 1996; Wilmot, 
2005). A case study of the CPSG may not be generalizable; however, it provides better 
knowledge of high repayment rate achievement of a community member-constituted MFI in 
Thailand. This knowledge can be applied to other community member-established MFIs 
operating in Thai context.     
 
3.3 Data collection   
 
The data used in this study is collected between March 7th to 20th, 2010 through the CPSG’s 
documents, an interview, and observation. 
 
The CPSG’ documents 
The CPSG’s documents associated with the content of this research comprise of the lending 
contract and the group regulations in case of delinquency and default. 
 
Interviews 
The researcher divides the interviewees into two groups: key informants and respondents. The 
key informants are those who can provide deep information regarding the CPSG and have 
enough time for the interview, for instance, the founder of the group and the committee. An 
interview with key informants will be in the form of in-depth interviews. For the respondents 
who are the group members, they do not have much time for the interview since after 
attending group activities they have to go back to their works which mostly are in the field of 
agriculture. Therefore, a focused interview is the most proper way for the respondents.   
 
Observation 
By attending the monthly group meeting, the direct observation is for the purpose of seeking 
additional information regarding the group process and/or the social process. The researcher 
believes that these processes will influence the level of repayment rates of the group.  
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4 Background for the empirical study 
 
The following chapter presents an empirical introduction to microfinance in Thailand, an 
overview of the Chanthaburi Province, and the background of the CPSG.   
 
4.1 Microfinance in Thailand 
 
Although there is no clear evidence regarding the origin of microfinance in Thailand, there is 
no doubt that individual lenders, for example, traders and landlords, have existed in the 
society for a long time, so have Thailand. Due to high interest rates charged by the individual 
lender, the Thai government has put an effort to provide cheap credit to the poor through 
formal and semi-formal microfinance institutions. However, outreach of those government-
launched MFIs has been limited (and sometimes the lending process of these MFIs is too 
complicated for illiterate borrowers); therefore, the community members need to form the 
informal credit group for helping each other by themselves.     
 
Ministry of Finance has divided the microfinance system in Thailand into three main 
categories: formal and large MFIs, semi-formal MFIs, and informal MFIs (www, Banking 
with the Poor Network, 2011). 
 
Formal and large MFIs 
Formal and large MFIs are those conventional banks which service the rural entrepreneur as 
the key client and operate under prudential regulations (ibid.). For example, Bank of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), Government Savings Bank (GSB), and 
SME Development Bank. On the one hand formal and large MFIs can widely serve the rural 
entrepreneur financial services, but on the other hand, adhering to the strict process of the 
conventional bank, for example, collateral requirement and a complicated lending process, 
has been an important obstacle to accessing the credit for the poor. 
 
Semi-formal MFIs 
To improve an opportunity of accessing the credit for the poor, the government has launched 
semi-formal MFIs which operate under the  lower level of conventionally banking processes 
than formal and large MFIs. In other words, semi-formal MFIs have operated under non-
prudential regulations (ibid.). In addition to providing the loan, promoting savings and 
investment in the community are the additional mission for semi-formal MFIs (ibid.). For 
example, credit union cooperatives, registered savings-for-production groups, Village and 
Urban Revolving Fund, et al. 
 
Informal MFIs 
Apart from two government-sponsored MFIs referred to above, in Thailand there have also 
been NGOs-supported and community member-based MFIs throughout the country. Most of 
them have adopted either the village bank or the solidarity group as the operating model 
(ibid.). Community members’ savings are the main capital for lending to those members who 
want to borrow. Although at the outset gathering the savings from community members was 
so difficult to do because of lack of a government guarantee, presently informal independent 
MFIs, especially self-help savings groups, have been proven to be the most successful 
microfinance model in Thailand (ibid.) 
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At the present time under the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) Phase II during 2010 – 
2014, the government aims at promoting financial accessibility to various groups of 
population, especially for unbanked and undeserved segments (www, Microfinance Thailand, 
2011;  www, Microfinance Focus, 2011). Some regulations have been relaxed for allowing 
new domestic and foreign microfinance providers to set up operations (Economist Intelligent 
Unit, 2010). Before starting the business, a new microfinance provider needs to be approved 
from the Bank of Thailand and Ministry of Finance (ibid.). In other words, the government 
attempts to systematize the new microfinance provider. On the one hand licensing new 
microfinance players will extend low-income individuals’ opportunity for reaching financial 
services, but on the other hand, it will increase the degree of competition between 
formal/semi-formal MFIs and informal MFIs. There is a high possibility, in a foreseeable 
future, that informal MFIs will be forced out of the market due to their deficient 
competitiveness. 
 
In line with the evolution of microfinance mentioned in chapter 2, MFIs in Thailand have 
been gradually transforming government-sponsored MFIs (Stage II) into commercial MFIs 
(Stage III). 
 
4.2 Overview of the Chanthaburi Province 
 
Chanthaburi is one of the eastern provinces of 
Thailand as shown in figure 5. The neighboring 
provinces are Chonburi, Chachoengsao, Sa Kaeo, 
Trat, and Rayong. Chathaburi has the area of 
6,338 square kilometers with a population (in 
April, 2011) of 515,842 (www, Chanthaburi 
Governor’s Office, 2011). The province is 
divided into 10 districts. These districts are 
further subdivided into 76 sub-districts and 728 
villages5 (ibid.).  
 
Unlike other regions, the eastern one has been 
arranged as the main industrial area of Thailand. 
There are 21 industrial estates located in this 
region (www, Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand, 2011). Becoming an industrial area has 
accompanied with the high level of infrastructure, 
for example, electricity, water, and transport. For 
this reason, every province in this region will 
have better infrastructure than the others, except 
Bangkok and vicinities which have been the main 
commercial area of Thailand for a long time.  
 
The economy of Chanthaburi has mainly depended on two major sectors: agriculture and 
business. Most of the people in Chanthaburi are the crofter (www, Chanthaburi Governor’s 
Office, 2011). According to National Statistical Office (NSO), in 2008 per capita income of 
population of Chanthaburi accounts for 78435 Baht, markedly increasing from 43743 Baht in 
1999 (www, NSO, 2011).  Income per capita of the whole country in 2008 is equal to 136954 
                                                          
5 In Thailand, the village is the smallest official political unit, and is under the sub-district, district, and province 
levels, respectively. 
         Figure 5: Map of Chanthaburi province 
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Baht (ibid.). Interestingly, having lower income per capita than the whole country does not 
mean Chanthaburi people live in poverty since, in 2008, income per capita of Chanthaburi 
province is four times higher than the poverty line with 18948 Baht (www, Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board, 2011). 
 
In conclusion, there are two social characteristics overlapping within Chanthaburi province: 
urban and rural. On the one hand resulting from encouraging the eastern region to be the main 
industrial area, Chanthaburi province has been gradually propelled into urban society, 
especially in terms of infrastructure, but on the other hand, still mainly relying on agricultural 
sectors, the society has maintained the tight relationship between community members. This 
represents the outstanding characteristic6 of the rural society in Thailand. 
 
4.3 Background of the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
4.3.1 Brief history of the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
 
Two decade ago, economic and social problems were two underlying problems of Thailand, 
and the government agencies had low potential to deal with these problems promptly and 
efficiently. In 1990, one Buddhist monk7 in Trat province, who is the founder of the Trat 
Province Savings Group, believed that villagers have the potential, which is called “social 
capital8”, to deal with these problems by themselves, not totally relying on the government 
(Khacha, 2006). He also thought that the profit-maximizing objective, which is the ultimate 
goal of capitalism, is not harmful per se (it is a reasonable objective for doing the business), 
but the profit should be partly allocated back to the customer or the community (ibid.). This is 
consistent with the double bottom line concept which gives emphasis on two main aspects of 
doing business: economic and social (Tulchin, 2003). Additionally, in contrast to the 
government officer who acquires the welfare before and after retirement, the rural villagers 
who mostly are the small farmer have no security. Lack of welfare affects the villager to be 
vulnerable to negatively unexpected shocks. 
 
To solve the problems mentioned above, the solution is to group the community members 
together in the form of a savings group. The group will operate like the financial institution 
that the member can deposit money9 and borrow money with low interest rates. The group’s 
profit will be transferred to “a welfare fund”. The major responsibility of this fund is to 
provide welfare services coving health, occupation, education, elderly, and death, to the group 
members. Reaching low-cost loans and obtaining the welfare can help the members improve 
their quality of life.    
                                                          
6 Most Thai rural communities are associated with agriculture-based production, as it has been for centuries. 
Therefore, when mentions rural communities, it also refers to agriculture-based ones. 
7Apart from being spiritual leaders, the Buddhist monk in Thailand has also played role as the informal 
community leader who gets reliability from community members. In case of forming the saving group, indeed, 
the monk has no formal authority to do, but he can point out to the villager the benefit obtained after forming the 
savings group. Then, the villagers will form the saving group by themselves, and the monk will be the consultant 
of the group. 
8 The underlying social capital behind the savings group model is “oath” i.e., before becoming the group 
members, everyone has to take the oath that he/she will deposit money and/or amortize the loan every month. 
This is the most important rule. 
9 With the economic reason, the borrowing interest will be higher than the savings one. From the interview, 
interestingly, if there are two choices of interest rates: low borrowing interest with low saving one and the 
opposite, a number of group members prefer the former rather than the latter. Furthermore, in the long run, the 
member will focus only on low borrowing interest and the level of welfare he/she will obtain, by not requiring 
any saving interest.  This aspect will be discussed more in the following chapter. 
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On 7th May 1990, the villagers in Koh-kwang village, Huay-rang sub-district, Mueang district, 
Trat province, grouped together and named “the Trat Province Savings Group”. This was the 
beginning of the monk-initiated savings group in Thailand10 (Khacha, 2006).  
 
Six years later, PhraManus Khanthithammo the founder of the CPSG had an opportunity to 
visit the Trat saving group. He foresaw that this model will be beneficial to Chanthaburi 
people, but its regulations should be adjusted to be consistent with the social context of 
Chanthaburi. On 10th March 1996, the first CPSG was founded at Phluyang village, Seephaya 
sub-district, Thamai district with the members of 108 and the initial savings of 6810 Baht 
(Boonla, 2003). 
 
4.3.2 The objectives of the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
 
The CPSG has four objectives as follows (Community Organizations and Partners Support 
Office, 2010):  
 
1. To incorporate the ethical aspect into human resource development.   
2. To encourage social and economic development and preserve Thai culture and 
tradition. 
3. To encourage way of living that improves community health. 
4. To encourage self dependence by establishing community welfare management. 
 
4.3.3 The Chanthaburi Province Savings Group at the present time 
Currently, the CPSG comprises of 125 sub-groups scattering around 300 villages in 10 
districts, with the members of 60000. The group’s working capital account for 700 million 
Baht, 400 million Baht of which comes from the members’ savings deposit while another 300 
million is from the accrued returns (ibid.). The members’ savings deposit will be sent to the 
group’s savings account for the purpose of lending to the group member. For the accrued 
returns, its main purpose is used for providing the welfare service on behalf of the welfare 
fund. In addition, if the welfare payment is less than the welfare fund’ capital, the excess 
capital will also be used for lending to the group members.   
 
The group has been structuralized into three levels: micro, meso, and macro. One hundred and 
twenty five micro-level sub-groups, of which the main obligation is to provide the financial 
services and welfare to the member directly, are geographically grouped and monitored by 
seven sections at the meso level, while the CPSG is the first in command. Furnishing the 
financial services is not the main responsibility of the meso and macro levels, their main task 
is monitoring and coordinating in the overall level. This organizational structure is shown in 
figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Indeed, the savings group model in Thailand can be divided into three main categories: monk-initiated, 
villager-initiated, and government agency-initiated. In this research, we will solely focus on the monk-initiated 
savings group.  
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Figure 6: The organizational structure of the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
 
The welfare provision of the savings group is likely to be an innovative means of using the 
profit since mostly the MFIs’ profit will be paid back to the member only in terms of 
dividend. Presently, the CPSG’s welfare provision covers three main aspects: health, death, 
and education. 
 
- Health: If a member is admitted to the hospital, the savings group will compensate  
100 – 300 Baht per night for 5 nights but not over 30 nights. This can be varied across each 
sub-group depending on size11 of the welfare fund of each sub-group. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Numbers of years in operation and members are two important factors affecting size of the welfare fund. 
Sub-groups 
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Sub-groups 
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Sub-groups 
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Sub-groups 
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with 14 sub-groups 
(Meso level) 
 
Source: Khanthithammo (2010) 
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- Death: If a member is dead, his/her family will obtain the funeral compensation  
from the savings group of 5,000 – 100000 Baht depending on size of the welfare fund of each 
sub-group. 
- Education: In the special occasions, such as New Year, Father Day, and Mother  
Day, the savings group will reward the young members with the scholarship of 100 – 10000 
Baht depending on size of the welfare fund of each sub-group. 
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5 The empirical results  
 
This chapter presents the data collected from the fieldwork through an interview, observation, 
and the CPSG’ documents, including the operation of the CPSG, the lending process of the 
CPSG, the explanation of a 100 percent repayment rate, and the CPSG’s regulations. 
 
5.1 The operation of the Chanthaburi Province Saving Group 
 
According to an interview with PhraManus who is the founder of the CPSG and the 
committee, the operation of the CPSG has been divided into three levels in accordance with 
the level of the organizational structure described above: micro, meso, and macro. The 
operation of all three levels will occur only in the monthly meeting since all committees have 
their routine works. Excessive meetings will negatively affect their works.  
 
At the macro level, the monthly meeting will comprise of the meso-level committees from 
seven sections and the macro-level committees, leading by Phramanus as a chairman. The 
meso committees will report the overall performances and problems of each section. 
Particularly in case of significant problems, the macro committees and Phramanus will help 
each area solve the problems. The macro committees will inform the meso committee about 
the group’s policies and information from external organizations. At the meso-level monthly 
meeting, the micro committees of each section will report its financial performance and 
problems. Problems that cannot be solved at the micro and meso levels will be brought to the 
macro level for further discussion. The meso committees have a responsibility to inform the 
micro committees about the information received from the macro-level meeting.    
 
At the micro level, each sub-group’s members have the authority to elect the committees at 
least 5 people with 1-year tenure, and the micro committees will be subsequently elected to be 
the committees in the higher level. Their responsibilities are to conduct the savings and 
lending processes, to make an accounting report, to publicize the information from the meso 
and macro levels to the members, and to manage the sub-group’s welfare fund. At this level, 
it is worth noting that in the absence of financial support from the government or other 
organizations like the CPSG, the members’ savings is the most essential source of capital. 
This leads to one of the CPSG’ important rules stating that every member must deposit money 
with 100 Baht to his/her savings account every month. The money from the members’ savings 
accounts will be transferred to the sub-group’s savings account, and then will be lent out to 
those members who want to borrow with the loan interest rate of 12 percent per year. The 
borrowing members must amortize their loans and interest monthly. Thereby, at the monthly 
group meeting, the sub-group will obtain the revolving capital from three sources: savings 
deposit, amortization payments, and interest payments.  
 
At the end of every year, the sum of interest profit gained from lending through the savings 
account will be divided into two portions: 25 percent and 75 percent. Twenty five percent of 
the interest profit will be paid back to the members in terms of dividend, and another seventy 
five percent will be sent to the welfare fund as the capital for welfare provision. Normally, the 
welfare fund’s capital will exceed the welfare payment, or there will be the excess capital. 
This excess capital will be lent out to the member with the loan interest rate of 12 percent per 
year, this rate is equal to the lending from the sub-group’s savings account. But interest profit 
gained from lending through the welfare fund will not be paid back to the member; rather, it 
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75% profit from 
lending through the 
saving account 
Members 
Interest  
Or the group’s profit  100% profit from 
lending through 
the welfare fund 
will be sent to the welfare fund all. For this reason, the welfare fund of the CPSG has been 
prospering rapidly. We can draw the financial flow described above as shown in figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The sub-group’s financial flow 
 
5.2 The lending process of the Chanthaburi Province Savings 
Group 
 
First of all, being a community member does not guarantee that he/she will receive the 
lending service from the CPSG as the group will provide all services only for the group 
member.  To be eligible for a membership, he/she has to live in a community at least 1 year 
and take an oath that he/she will put money of 100 Baht into the savings account every month. 
A new member is required to deposit at least 3 months and 12 months to be eligible for the 
lending service and welfare service respectively. 
 
After deposit for 3 months, a member who wants to borrow has to sign a loan contract with 
two sureties who are the group member, in place of pledging any collateral. In the loan 
contract, the borrower will state the desired amount of loans and monthly principal 
amortization. Particularly, the amortization must be higher than 500 Baht per month. An 
interview with the committee found that mostly all three members, a borrower and two 
sureties, in a borrowing group will guarantee each other in another contract. For example, Mr. 
A is a borrower and MR. B and Mr. C. are the sureties. If Mr. B turns to be a borrower, Mr. A 
and Mr. C will be the sureties. And frequently all three members are relatives living in the 
same family.  
 
The borrower will be charged the interest rate of 1 percent per month or 12 percent per year. 
This rate is higher than that of the commercial bank with 7 – 8 percent per year (www, Bank 
of Thailand, 2011). According to an interview with group members, there are three main 
reasons why they are willing to borrow money from the CPSG despite being charged higher 
interest rates than the commercial bank. First, the borrower realizes that his/her interest 
payment will be sent to the welfare fund, and he/she will gain the benefit from this fund in the 
future. Second, if we consider the monthly savings as collateral, a member who monthly 
Providing welfare to 
25% profit from lending through the 
savings account back to the member  
in terms of dividend 
Lending to 
Monthly amortization  
Lending to 
Savings 100 Baht / month 
Savings Account 
Welfare Fund 
The Savings Group  
(micro level) 
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Collection rates = Amount collected this period   = 1 or 100% 
                                 Amount due this period  
= 1
deposits with 100 Baht for two years (as collateral’s value of 24000 Baht) will be eligible to 
borrow the money of 30000 to 50000 Baht, depending on the highest level of loans of each 
sub-group. On the other hand, borrowing the same amount of loans from the commercial bank 
the collateral’s value will be higher than the principal. In other words, borrowing an amount 
of money the CPSG requires the lower collateral value than the commercial bank. Lastly, the 
lending process of the GPSG is less complicated than which of the commercial banks; hence, 
the member can easily access to the loan. 
 
At the micro-level monthly meeting, the credit approval process will be conducted by the 
committee. The committee’s responsibility is to check the loan contracts for accuracy, for 
example, names of the borrower and two sureties, the desired amount of loans and monthly 
amortization. In particular, the desired amount of loans cannot exceed the funeral 
compensation since if a borrower is dead, the funeral compensation will be used to repay the 
dead borrower’s loan. Based on an interview with PhraManus, the committee has no right to 
determine who will acquire the loan since every member has right to borrow money from the 
group. By doing so, the committee’s bias against some members cannot impede them to reach 
the group’s lending service. Moreover, during an observation, the researcher found that if 
demand for loans exceeds money the sub-group has, all borrowers will make a collective 
agreement by prioritizing the need of each borrower. But if the borrowers cannot make the 
agreement, the committee will equally allocate money to all borrowers.  
 
As stated by the micro-level committee, the borrowing purpose can be categorized into two 
types: occupation and consumption. Since most of the group members are in agricultural 
sectors, the loan will be used to buy agricultural equipments, for instance, fertilizer, machine 
and seed. For the consumption purpose, the group member will use the loan to buy home 
appliances, for instance, televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, cell phones, and so on. 
 
5.3 The explanation of a 100 percent repayment rate 
 
In this part, the researcher aims to clarify the notion of achieving a 100 percent repayment rate 
of the CPSG by using the delinquency indicators mentioned in the theoretical part. According 
to an interview with PhraManus and the committee, they claimed that all sub-groups gain all 
principal amortizations and interest payment every month. However, we should bear in mind 
that gaining all principal amortizations and interest payment every month does not mean all 
sub-groups have no delinquent/default borrowers since sometimes two sureties of each loan 
may take responsibility for paying money back instead of them. In other words, employing 
group-lending contracts with joint liability is the way of transfering the burden of 
delinquency/defualt from the sub-group to the member. 
 
Gaining all principal amortizations and interest payment every month means that the actual 
amount collected each month is equal to the expected amount due each month. This is directly 
associated with the formula of “collection rates”. We can draw an equation below. 
 
 
       
 
 
Therefore, a 100 percent repayment rateof the CPSG is similar to a 100 percent collectin rate. 
In a sense, a 100 percent collection rate of the CPSG can be related to arrears rates and  
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Arrears rates = Late payment   = 0% 
                           Gross loans  
= 0
 
PAR0 = Outstanding balance of loans past due   = 0% 
                                Gross loans  
= 0 
 PAR012 as shown in the equation below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the 100 percent collection rate of the CPSG are similar to a zero percent arrears 
rate and a zero percent PAR0. Particularly, a zero percent PAR rate refers to a circumstance 
that the CPSG has no outstanding loans with overdue payment; hence, its risk of defaulted 
loans will be at the low level, not zero because of the unpredictable situation in the future.  
 
5.4 The regulations of the Chanthaburi Province Savings Group 
 
According to the CPSG’s documents, delinquency and default are two important aspects 
stated in the group’s regulations. An interview with PhraManus and the committee, the 
regulations result from the group’s resolution which has been refined and adapted over a 
decade, and they have been adopted by all 125 sub-groups of the CPSG. 
 
The regulations regarding delinquency 
There are three regulations dealing with the delinquency problem as follows: 
 
1) In the monthly meeting, if there is a delinquent borrower, the micro-level committee  
will not lend out the money. Moreover, the surety of the delinquent borrower will be unable to 
borrow money from the group and/or guarantee other borrowing members. Note that a 
member can sign the loan guarantee for various members. In this case, two sureties of the 
delinquent borrower have responsibility to bring the money back since the sureties will be 
subsequently forced by those members who want to borrow. However, the group members 
who want to borrow are not allowed to pay a debt instead of a delinquent borrowers.  
 
During an observation, the researcher found that there are two circumstances with regard to 
the delinquent borrower. First, a delinquent borrower attends the monthly meeting, but he/she 
is unable to repay. Therefore, two sureties will equally pay instead. The delinquent borrower 
will repay them afterwards. Mostly, in this case, the borrower and two sureties will be 
relatives. Second, a delinquent borrower does not present at the meeting, two sureties will 
pursue the delinquent borrower and then force him/her to repay. This may imply that, in a 
surety’s point of view, not attending the monthly meeting of the delinquent borrower seems to 
be an intention of missing the repayment; therefore, the surety has to force him/her to repay. 
 
2) The borrower who misses the repayment will be deprived of the borrowing right for  
one year. After one year of punishment, the borrower will be able to borrow 50 percent of the 
initial loan contract and must strictly amortize for 1 year. After that, the borrower will be able 
to borrow 100 percent of the initial loan contract. According to an interview with the 
committee, sometimes the borrowing members will borrow money from local moneylenders 
                                                          
12 For the CPSG, a loan with one day late will be categorized as the delinquent loan; hence, the PAR of the 
CPSG is PAR0 
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with interest rates of 10-20 percent per month to repay the group because they do not want to 
be deprived of the borrowing right.  
 
3) In case of unintended delinquency, the borrower can negotiate with the committee for  
extending the payment period. Unintended delinquency refers to a situation that the borrower 
suffers from the unpredictable events, such as the volatility of weather and accidents, which 
negatively affect the borrower’s repayment ability. Extending the repayment period will help 
the borrower relieve a difficult time. In particular, numbers of group members are in 
agricultural sectors, they have to face with seasonal risks inevitably. Two frequent natural 
problems faced by the crofters in Chanthaburi province are flood and drought (www, 
Chanthaburi Provincial Agricultural Extension Office, 2011). 
 
The regulations regarding default 
There are three regulations concerning the default problem as follows: 
 
1) A member who has an outstanding loan or is a surety for other members will be able  
to resign from the membership as long as the member or his/her signatories pay the 
outstanding loan and interest. Otherwise the committee has authority to foreclose money in 
his/her savings account until it covers the outstanding loan and interest. But if the money in 
his/her accounts is less than the outstanding loan and interest, the committee can foreclose 
money in his/her family members’ savings accounts until it covers the outstanding loan and 
interest. We will notice that on the one hand the borrowing member may not be required to 
pledge any physical collateral, but on the other hand, in case of default, his/her savings 
account will play role as financial collateral. This may imply that obliging the members to 
deposit every month seems to be the way to implicitly build up financial collateral, and 
frequently savings behavior is used to distinguish between good borrowers and bad 
borrowers.  
 
A borrower who is foreclosed money in the savings accoumt will be dismissed from the 
membership. This is called as involuntary resignation. Resignation from the membership 
means that the member will not be able to claim on the group’s welfare services. Based on an 
interview with the member, excluding from the group’s welfare services is the significant 
incentive for the member not to resign from the membership. This is consistent with the 
incentive to borrow money from the group despite being charged higher interest rates than the 
commercial bank.  
 
2) In case of intended default, the committees and group members will make a resolution  
to punish the default borrower. Additionally, if two sureties of that default borrower do not 
repay the loan and interest within 3 months, they will be punished from the group as well. The 
punishment will appear in the form of a boycott on communication, trade, and so on. In the 
worst case, if a default borrower moves to a new community, the group committees will 
inform the new community’s leader about the behavior of that default borrower.  
 
3) If a borrowing member is dead – called as unintended default, his/her funeral  
compensation from the group’ welfare fund will be used to repay his/her outstanding loan and 
interest. As mentioned above, the amount of loans will not exceed the funeral compensation: 
hence, the dead borrower’s relatives will not shoulder the debt. 
 
In conclusion, delinquency regulations and default regulations have been designed to cope 
with both voluntary and involuntary situations. 
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6 Analysis and discussion 
 
In this chapter, the researcher aims to address the research question referred in chapter 1 by 
using the theoretical framework and the empirical data. The research question is 
 
- What are the key factors underlying the CPSG’s high repayment rate? 
 
6.1 Key factors underlying high repayment rate achievement 
 
First of all, the researcher would like to give emphasis on the condition leading to high 
repayment. Theoretically, the agency problem between the lender (principal) and the borrower 
(agent) is the significant obstacle to attaining high repayment rates. The agency problem 
caused by informational asymmetries has been divided into three intervals with three 
problems: before granting loans (adverse selection), after granting loans (moral hazard), and 
after investment returns have been realized (strategic default). Consequently, to reach a 100 
percent repayment rate the lender has to eliminate these problems.  
 
Based on the empirical data, the researcher found that the 100 percent repayment rate of the 
CPSG has resulted from two key factors: jointly liable group-lending contracts and strong 
incentives.  
 
Jointly liable group-lending contracts 
Theoretically, jointly liable group-lending contracts will help the lender to mitigate three 
agency problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and strategic default, and then lead to a 
high repayment rate. Particularly joint liability is the underlying incentive for all borrowers in 
a borrowing group to solve these problems.   
 
As for the CPSG, the researcher found that the group-lending scheme has been used to 
mitigate only the strategic default problem through a high degree of social pressure. There are 
two reasons why adverse selection and moral hazard have not been solved. First, on the one 
hand close relationship between the group members will bring about a low level of 
informational asymmetry which seems to be the key ability to solve adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, but on the other hand, close relationship, especially in the form of 
relatives, may lead to a collusion between the group members to neglect screening and 
monitoring processes. Often, the group members who are the relatives feel considerate of each 
other to screen and monitor their relatives’ investments. Second, in this study the committees 
have screening and monitoring competence like the group members since there is no 
informational asymmetry between the committees (working on behalf of the lender) and the 
group members13. Despite having screening and monitoring competence, the committees are 
not allowed to do so because all members who can find two sureties to guarantee their loans 
will be able to obtain the loans. The committees cannot determine who will or will not acquire 
the loan. Moreover, the borrowing members are allowed to spend their loans on non-income 
generating activities like consumption, not restricted only to income generating activities (as 
stated in the empirical results). Neglect of screening and monitoring processes may pose the 
risk of delinquency/defualt not only to the surety but also to the lender. 
                                                          
13 In the theory, a low level of informational asymmetries will occur only between the borrowers while in this 
study it will occur not only between the borrowers but also between the borrowers and the lender (or the 
committee).  A low level of informatioal asymmetries between the committee and the borrowers asises out of the 
fact that the commitee live in the same community as the group members or they are also the community 
member like the group members. 
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For this reason, to ascertain that every sub-group will be paid the money back in case of 
delinquency and/or default, the CPSG needs to design the group-lending scheme with a very 
high degree of social pressure through imposing joint responsibility not only on the surety but 
also on every group member who wants to borrow money. This is presented in the form of 
one of the regulations which states that if there is a delinquent borrower, the micro-level 
committee will not lend out the money to other members in that month. We will notice that 
from this regulation the delinquent borrower and the surety will be enforced by the group 
member who wants to borrow money. This is different from the group lending with joint 
liability in the theoretical part i.e., in the theory the responsibility to enforce a delinquent 
and/or default borrower will only belong to the surety within the borrowing group, and the 
borrowing member in a borrowing group cannot interfere in other borrowing groups.  
 
Achieving the 100 percent repayment rate or collection rates does not mean the sub-group has 
no delinquent or default borrowers. Imposing a high level of joint responsibility on the group 
members who want to borrow will assure the sub-group that the actual amount collected each 
month will be equal to the expected amount due each month i.e., they will enforce either the 
borrower or the surety to repay the debt for the purpose of reaching their borrowing rights. 
 
Strong incentives  
Apart from enforcing the borrower to repay the loan, the researcher found that the CPSG has 
also generated an incentive for borrowers to voluntarily repay the loan. As mentioned in the 
empirical data, a borrower who misses the repayment will be deprived of the borrowing right 
for one year. Being excluded from the group’s lending service will negatively affect group 
members who are in the agricultural sectors. Since, during a planting period, those who are 
the farmer or crofter will have a high demand for money to invest in their cultivated areas, 
being excluded from the group’s lending service means they may have to borrow money from 
local moneylenders with high interest rates to carry on their occupations. Consequently, 
numbers of borrowing members who are in agricultural sectors will try to avoid missed 
repayment.       
 
Additionally, the welfare service is an important incentive for the borrowing members to 
repay debts. As stated in default regulations, in case of a default borrower, the committees 
have authority to foreclose his/her money in the savings account, including to reimburse the 
group for the outstanding debt. By doing so, that member will be dismissed from the 
membership, and he/she will be unable to obtain the group’s welfare service. Based on an 
interview with the group members, they think that the group’s welfare services are beneficial 
to them, particularly a large amount of funeral compensation. The group members stated that 
their funeral compensations will be the legacy for their descendants. For this reason, they do 
not want to be excluded from the group’s welfare services. Furthermore, the welfare service is 
also an incentive for borrowing money from the group despite being charged higher interest 
rates than the commercial bank.                                        
 
6.2 Discussion 
 
As mentioned above, the CPSG has employed the group-lending scheme to mitigate only the 
strategic default problem, by neglecting adverse selection and moral hazard problems. By 
doing so, on the one hand all sub-groups of the CPSG will assure that they can definitely 
maintain their financial sustainability, but on the other hand, this seems that the CPSG has 
been shifing the burden of default risk to the members. According to Stiglitz (1990), the 
borrowers (or the members) are in a worse position to bear default risk than the lender. 
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Informational advantages of the borrowers do not lead to the capacity for bearing the default 
risk. 
 
Especially neglect of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the borrowing member 
will have a chance of investing in a high risk project without peer supervision14. This is 
different from the theoretical part i.e., in the theory all members in a borrowing group will 
supervise each other investing in the project with an acceptable risk level for the purpose of 
preventing involuntary default. In the researcher’s point of view, lack of peer supervision will 
result in a high possibility of involuntary default, such as being unprofitable and less liquid, 
since high risk projects are most likely to fail. Although the group’s regulations have been 
designed to deal with involuntary default, they have not covered business failure yet. 
Consequently, if the CPSG’s borrowing member faces a business failure problem, he/she will 
be deteriorated by enforcement of loan repayment. In addition, the borrowing member is 
allowed to use the loan for non-income generating activities like consumption. This may 
affect the borrowing member in the same way as involuntary default described earlier.  
 
In conclusion, employing jointly liable group-lending contracts help the CPSG attain a 100 
percent repayment rate, but this does not mean all borrowing members will have better 
financial status. Some borrowing members may be deteriorated from this lending scheme as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 The word “supervision” includes screening and monitoring processes. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate what is the important factors underlying high 
repayment rate achievement of the CPSG. The last chapter of this study is intending to answer 
the aim and provide suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 Findings of the study 
 
There are two critical factors underlying high payment rate achievement of the CPSG: 
employing jointly liable group-lending contracts and generating strong incentives. Noticeably, 
the jointly liable group-lending contract has been employed in mitigating only the strategic 
default problem. The adverse selection and moral hazard have not been soved for two reasons. 
First, in the Chanthaburi province’s social context which a relationship between the villagers 
is very close, there is a high possibility that the borrowing member will exploit the close 
relationship between the group members for neglecting screening and monitoring process. 
Second, although the commitees have screening and monitoring competence, they are not 
allow to do so. Neglect of adverse selection and moral hazard will pose the risk of 
delinquency/default not only to the surety but also to the lender. Consequently, to ensure that 
the group will be paid money back in case of a delinquent or default borrower, the CPSG 
needs to adopt the group-lending contract with a very high social pressure through imposing 
joint responsibility on both the surety and those group members who want to borrow money. 
In other words, both the borrowing member and the surety will be subsequently enforced by 
those members who want to borrow money. 
 
In addition, the CPSG has generated two significant incentives for borrowers to repay the loan 
voluntarily. First, depriving the delinquent borrower of the borrowing right for one year has 
encouraged the borrowing member to repay the loan punctually since being excluding from 
the group’s lending service means he/she has to borrow money from local moneylenders with 
high interest rate. Second, the default borrower will be dismissed from the membership, and 
he/she will be unable to obtain the group’s welfare services anymore. According to an 
interview with the group members, receiving the welfare services, particularly the funeral 
compensation, is the underlying incentive for the members to repay the loan on time. 
 
However, employing jointly liable group-lending contracts seems that the CPAG has been 
transferring default risk to the borrowing members who are in a worse position to bear default 
risk than the lender (Stiglitz, 1990). Moreover, the borrowing member whose investment fails 
may be deteriorated by this lending scheme since he/she has to face the business failure 
problem and enforcement of loan repayment simultaneously.  
 
7.2 Suggestions for future research 
 
Although the CPSG can achieve a 100 percent repayment rate leading to financial 
sustainability, it is too early to conclude that the CPSG is the best microfinance model in 
Thailand. As was stressed in Hamada (2010), apart from financial sustainability aspect, MFIs 
should also give emphasis on outreach to the poor and making a positive impact. Given this, a 
suggestion for future research is to measure the level of outreach as well as impact of the 
CPSG on the borrowing members. Particularly the aspect of the effect on the borrowing 
members, the possible future research is to investigate the share of repayment made by the 
borrowing members and/or the sureties.  
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